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CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS
OF THE NAVY
Joseph 13. McDevitt
I t is always a pleasllre for me to be
here at the War College to discuss with
you some of the current problem areas
that we face in international law.
When we speak of the Navy's area of
operations at sea, we are speaking of air,
surface, and suhsurface operations in an
area which is almost entirely heyond Ihe
sovereign territory of the United States
and any othrr nation. Our right to lise
this area is determined largely by a
variety of rules of internutionallaw.
Th·ere arc many kinds of thread
woven into the fabric known as interna·
tional law. Whether written or unwritten, international law represents the
consensus of the community of nations.
I t is evidenced in part by interna·
tional conventions which are binding on
slates hy agreement and, in many euses,
arc hindin~ h('('ausl' tlwy codify eus·
tOlllury internutionallaw.
II is in part r('pn~s('ntcd hy stale
prul'licl's of long standing which, though
never formalized, huve been accepted,

shared, or ucquiesced in by the other
members of the community of nations.
[t is reflected by the decisions of the
International Court of Justice and the
derisions of the highest courts of the
various countries.
It includes tlH~ teachings and writings
of eminent publicists who have studied
the relationship between states in the
light of the times in which they lived. It
is this pucka~e that comprises the bulk
of internationalluw.
Though the concept of international
luw may lack a preciseness to he found
in municipal law, nevertheless it provides accepted standards for the measurements of the conduct of nations.
Our national policy is formulated
and executed within the framework of
the law of nutions. We are a purty to
muny ulliances of collective s(~<:urity
slIeh as NATO, SI':ATO, Ihn Organization of A Illerieun Slates, ulllong others.
We an~ bound by the ucccpled <:lIstoms
und practices between nations and by
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international conventions that hoth
prescribe and proscribe conduct both in
peace and in war.
International law is, of course, not a
completely effective instrument for international peace. But it has progrl'ssed
toward minimizing rr~ort to war or
armed conflict as a method of settling
international disputr8. When it fails to
prevent armed conflict, it still operates
to impose rights and duties on parties
and nonparties to tl\(~ confliet. i\lore
importantly, it provid(~s peaceful alternatives to armed conflict.
International law does not have a
system of sanctions as we define and
understand the term in municipal law,
but this does not indicate that international law is a myth, merely that it has
limitations. The same could be said of
any specialized Icgal system. There are
many sanctions under international law
which do work effectively. Among the
most obvious and effective of these is
the promise of reciprocation-either
favorable or adverse. This provides a
strong reason for states to ohscrve thc
rules.
Reconciling legal equality with political inequality remains a serious impediment to the development of international law. But effective seapower exercised in support of the rule of law can
he a positive force in providing a stahle
background for the continucd growth
and acceptance of international law.
One area of international law of
primary interest to the Navy is the law
of the sea. Weare in a time when the
oceans are being taken into a sphere of
politics; a plcthora of newspaper and
periodical articles on the law of the sea
comes from all nations and consequently creates a growing pressure on all
governments to publicly justify their
legal positions in this arl'a.
Tlwrl' has developl'd an alarming
h·ndency for compll'x international
Il'gal iI:~8\1eS to hrcoJlle political footballs. The dispute oVl'r the statm; of the
waters off portions of the coast of

South America has been straining relations between the United States and a
number of South American nations for
almost two decades. However. after a
series of preliminary meetings, the
United States entercd into discussions
with Chile, Ecuador, and Pl'ru in August
of last year aimed at arriving at a
solution to this problem. I was in
allendanee for a portion of these discussions. They are still in their preliminary stages and therrforc I cannot
elaborate on thcm except to note that
silting down at a conference tablc is a
first positive step taken toward the
resolution of this persistent dispute over
the right to use extensive areas of the
high seas. The heated controversy and
diploma,tic crisis occasioned by the tuna
boat seizures point up the danger involved in unilateral coastal state e1aims
to sovereignty over areas of the high
seas.
Even more dramatic and tragic events
have underlined the absolute necessity
for arriving at uniform international
I«'gal regimes for the world's oceans.
These were the seizure of the U.S.
intelligence ship Pueblo and the subsequent destruction of an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft by North Korea.
These incidents occurrcd on or over
high seas areas. I n the United States, in
the wake of the North Korean incidents,
the Congress has considered a legislative
proposal which would have undercut
our present position on the 3-mile limit
for the breadth of the territorial sea and
would have greatly hindered any change
for the formulation of any uniform
international limit in the future. This
proposal (S.J. Res 84) would have established a territorial sea which could vary
from 3 to 12 miles, depending on the
extent of the territorial sea claimed by
the other country involved; in other
words, a territorial sra based on mutuality. Administrative problems aside, the
problem with this is that it would have
bel'n tantamount to recognition of the
legality of exercising any measure of
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territorial sea jurisdiction out to 12
miles. A Senate vote on this proposal
was averted only after extensive briefings by DOn. This incident dl'monstraLed the dangl'r to opl'rationill mobility of recognizing the unilateral
extension of a nation's territorial sea
without providing for adequate safeguards for navigation rights.
Frequently, however, the easiest way
to lose a right is to press it to the
extr!'lIle. For example, until LI\(' heginning of this century, it was gencrally
agrecd that 3 miles was the maximum
breadLh of the territorial sea and that all
areas beyond were high seas in which all
nations, among other things, had an
equal right to fish. Since World War If
several nations-notably Japan and the
Soviet U nion- have developed huge fishing fleets which can operate off the
coasts of foreign countries thousands of
miles away. The first sign of reaction
came in Latin America, where, as J havc
mentioned, several states proclaimed
either 200-mile territorial seas or
!WO-mile exclusive fishing Z()JW~, in
order to control distant water fleets.
Then in 1964 some of the most cons!'rvative :l-mile states in Western
Europe signed the European Fisheries
Convention which, in effect, reserved all
fisheries out to 12 miles to these states.
Subsequently, in 1966, the United
States-the country which has the most
to gain from free mw of tl\(' seas and the
ain,pace above them-itself dl'clarl'd a
9-mile I'xclusivl' fishl'ri!'s zone extt·nding
sl'award from thl' outer limits of our
3-mile territorial s!'a.
Th!' establishment of this zone is an
example of how DOD, and the Navy in
particular, must recognize and evaluate
significant nonmilitary national pressures if the present dimensions of the
high seas arc to be maintainl'd.
Puhlic Law 119-6511 of 14 Ol'lohl'r
I !)(j() I'stablislwd thl' I)-mile contip;uolls
fishing zone. Thl' Sl'ltate' rl'port on this
legislation make's it I'refe'etly clear that
this was a reaction to intensive foreign

fishing operations off our coast. In
earlier years the Navy had opposed such
Il'gislation. It feared that the establishment of the fishing zone would be the
first step toward the undesirable formation of a 12-mile territorial sea.
In 1966 the Navy merely entcred no
objection to the zone-it did not support the establishment of the zone. In
retrospect, that may have been a mistake since the U.S. 12 mile fisheries
zone lends credence to an approaching
12-mile territorial sea. The argument
that such a zone was needed because of
Soviet intelligence activities was advanced by the interests that wanted the
zone established. It was never stated
that the AGI's-though they might have
trawler hulls-were warships and not
fishing vessels.
Since the enactment of Puhlic Law
BC)-65B, therc have been constant efforts
on the part of various interested lobbies
to widen the scope of the law to
prohibit all manner of activities to
foreign fishing vessels within the zone,
not just the extraction of fish from the
zone.
The most recent effort accomplished
the enactment of Senate bill 1752 (S.
1752) over opposition by the Department of Defense. The wording of this
amendment, whicIl makes it unlawful
for any non-U.S. vessel "to engage in
aetivites in support of a foreign fishery
fleet" within the contiguous fishing
zone or territorial sea, could be misinterpretl'd as authorizing interference
with activities which do not have any
relation to the protection of living
resources of the territorial sea or fisheries zone.
This is but a single illustration of
how specialized legislation can have
highly undesirable side effects. The
DOD continues to maintain that the
fisheries zone ig high seas for the purPOS(~ of navigation and that to qualify
tlH' right to navigate or operate in the
arca could be seen by others as a claim
of a 12-mile territorial sea rather than a
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contil!:uous fisheries zone. A series of
similar gpeeial-purpose hills could he
extremely d"trimental to our presently
avowed position ~upportinl!: the maintenance of the :3-mile territorial sea rule.
The United States initially supported
the :~-mile limit in 17c):~ when Secretary
of State Jefferson informed the British
and French :'Ilinisters that the United
States had adopted a :~-mile zone; it has
never ("Iainwd a I!:r!'alt'r distarH"~ as the
hreadth of the territorial sea. IL has Iwen
the traditional position of the United
States, moreover, that the 3-mile limit is
not only domesti:! law but that ;~ miles
has heen the maximum hreadLh of the
territorial sea it nt'ed recognize off Lhe
coasts of other states. The United States
has continued to support the doctrine
of the freedom of the seas by vigorously
opposing the claims of oLher governments to extend unilaterally Lheir territorial seas beyond 3 miles.
This problem of the gradual unilateral extension of the territorial sea of
coastal states exists where military
operaLions are eonccrned. All of us
know that if the United States forced
Soviet warships to stay, let us say, at
least 200 miles from our coast, thcn not
just the Soviet Union, but every country
in the world, would have a basis to
dt'mand that American warships sLay
200 llIiles from their coasts.
BuL when you have to explain Lhis to
a newf'paper editor who is involved in a
crusade againgL the presence of Soviet
intelligence f'hips off our coast, you are
put in the difficult position of saying
that, on balance, the defense of the
United States is hetter served if we let
those Russian ships stay there. But, I
a~k you, would this he true if it were
not for the worldwide deployment of
our air and naval forces? Jt is therefore
not ~urpriginl!: thaL mllny devl'lopinl!:
l'()untril'~ whi("h pI'n"'i"e no din'!'t inlt'r1':;1 in lI:;in~ thl' :;I'a:; al ~rt'al t1i"lalll"':;
from 1IIl'ir ~h()n' f,'('1 Ihal Illl'rt, is
something Lo ~ain and very Iillll' to
lose-in extending their territorial seas.

The Navy is one of the strongest
supporters of freedom of the seas. While
new lind vllried USI'S are enll~rging, navigation lind comnH'rt't' remain tlw IlIOSt
valuable uses of the ocean. Efforts by
coastlll states to impose unjustifiable
restrictions and to improperly encompass world sealanes within rlaimrd
territorial waLers must be resisted. Such
unilateral attempts to extend sovereign
control wiII rreatc confrontlltion situations with great potenLial for conflicL.
Very important problems of mobility
are involved. For example, while the
right of innocent passage of vesscls
through international straits may not be
sngpended, there are disputes regarding
the application of this right to warships
and regarding the application of the
criteria for identifying international
straits. Should the right to establish a
broader territorial sea be conceded without concomitant guarantees of passage
through waters of straits, intcrpretation
of the right of innocent passage would
become t'xtremdy critical. For cxample,
SOIllC stales have ('lailllrd a unilatrral
right to determine what kinds of passage
are innocent even when, by objective
standards, passage is clearly not prejudicial to peace, good order, or security
within the coastal state. Well over 100
siraits which would be within the sovrrI'ign Lerritory of eom;tlll states if, for
example, a 12-mile territorial sea were
conceded, might thl'n be closed to
transiL by possihly capricious interpretaLions of the right of innocent pllssage.
The Straits of Gibraltar, Dover, Bah el
i\landeh, and i\lalacca would be among
them. The disruptive effect that such
actions might have on our naval operations is obvious. Unless nllvigational
guarantees are internationally recognized by international agreement, the
(I.S. NlIvy cannot afford to Irnd its
support or !"('('ognition 10 IInilalc'rlll II'rritorial SI'II ('Iaims in I'X('I'SS of :! milt,s,
NI'illll'r (!ollld Ihe ,\ir I,'orel', I might
add, sinee no right of inn(l('('nt pa~sage
for staLe aircraft exists on the airspace
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ahove t!'rritorial watt·rt:. Of course, one
factor which could significantly affect
our continued adherence to the :3-mile
policy would be to negotiate, preferably
on a multilateral basis, for the maintenance of high seas passageways through
international straits regardl!'ss of the
breadth of the territorial sea. Such a
development would mitigate possible
extensions of ll'rritorial seas without
unduly j,'opardizing the worldwide
mobility of our naval fon~l~s.
Jn addition to tlw international problems raised hy the dispute over the
proper breadth of territorial seas, there
arc additional prohlem areas involving
the oceanic regimes which are of interest to the Navy. The continued discovery of new sources of both minerals
and foods in the seas and on the ocean
floor has occasion!'d a fantastic increase
in the emphasis on the development of
our technological ability to extract
these resources on a practical and competitive bash~.ln any area in which rapid
utilization occurs, the d,wclopment of a
set of valid rules or guidelines to saf!'guard against conflict among the various
users will be necessary. The developmcnt of such a set of rules is of prime
interest to the Navy. We will nndoubtedly be called upon to protect our
nationuls and tlll'ir I'conomil: udivitil's
on thr ocean floor beyond whut are
now recognized as ar!'as of coastal soverei~nty. Equally important will be our
task of rnsuring th!' propl'r utilization
of these srab!'d areas in the preservation
of our nutional security.
The sl~abed areas to which I have
bern refrrrin~ art' ~rnerally divided into
two principal rrgimes: thr Contilll'ntal
Shelf and the deep oeran floor.
Thr Continl'lltal Shelf is d!'fined by
the ] 95B Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf as till' seabed and
stlhsoil of till' "the suhmarilH' ar!'as
udjacl'nt to till' coast hut olllsidt' the
an'a of th!' lI'rritorial sl'a. to a dl'pth of
:WO meters, or heyond that limit. to
wlll're lhl' depth of the :'lIprrjacent

waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of said areas." This
convention embodies what we may call
the international law of the Continental
Shelf. The rules laid down by this
convention further provide that the
coastal state shall exercise "sovereign
rights" in these areas for the purpose of
exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed and
subsoil thereof. It must be noted that
this important convention affects only
exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources on the shelf. The
consent of the coastal state must be
ohtained "in respect of any research
concerning the Continental Shelf and
undertaken there." The convention, by
its own terms, in no way affects the
character of the superjacent waters as
high seas which remain open to all and
subject to the sovereignty of no nation.
The Continental Shelf is becoming
increasingly important as the technological ability to exploit its resources
advances at an ever-accelerating rate. An
increasing number of corporations
throughout the world are taking an
active interest in undersea operations.
They arc developing tools and technology for extended operations on the
Continental Shelf. The scientific and
academic communities arc also COIIducting many research and development
projects aimed at increasing man's effectiveness beneath the ocean's surface.
At pre$ent the extent of a nation's
jurisdiction over the resources of the
Continental Shelf is governed by the
"200 metl~r or exploitahility depth" test
of the 195B Continental Shelf Convention. This convention, however, COIltains no precise definition of the outer
boundary of the shelf. As a result,
domestic and international controversy
has arisen as to the ultimate boundary
of a nation's Continental Shelf. The
walt'rs have become more and morc
muddy as the arguments concerning
various boundary theories proliferate.
The United States has been a leader
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in discu~sions of this complex issue in
many intl'rnational forums. It is particularly likely that this maller will rel:t·ive
considerahle alll'ntion in the Unitt·d
Nations Seabeds CommiUee. The
United StaLes has clearly indicated the
importance of establishing a precise
Continental Shd f boundary and has
supported the principle that as soon as
practicable an internationally agreed
boundary should be determined.
The complex problems involved in
arriving at a precise outer boundary for
the Continental Shelf have not dampened world interest in discussing regimes
for the deep ocean floor beyond the
Continental Shelf. This broad expansealmost 7 miles deep at points-is largely
unknown and unexplored. Yet the very
mystery of the deep ocean floor stimulates some to assume that it is a vast
storehouse of easily available riches.
This, in turn, has prompted lively interest in the legal prohlems involved in thl\
utilization of this area. The Navy is, of
course, also interested in these problems
from the standpoint of the military
utilization of these seabeds.
Some have suggested that we divide
the ocean floor between coastal states
with median lines, much the same way
as the seahed in the North Sea has heen
divided. We must cOlu;ider the fact that,
under a median line formula, the United
States would rect'ive only a very narrow
strip in the Atlantic and that small
islands in the Pacific, some under European control, would hecome the center
of enormous seabed domains.
Others have urged turning the deep
oeean seaht'd over to the United Nations. Ambassador Pardo of l\'Ialta has
proposed ercating a new international
authority with broad powers to administer and police the deep ocean floor.
Senator P"II of Rhode Island has
stopped short of this, prop()sill~ that the
lInitl'd Nations bl' ~iVf\1I I{'a~ing authority over the d{'{'p ocean floor in
much the same way as the lntl'rior
Department has leasing authority over

our Continental Shelf.
There are, however, respccted voiccs
in both national and inLcrnational
forums which urge thaL we have Loo
soon become intoxicated with the
promise of riches in the deep oceans;
that we have little idea of what is to be
found there and wiII not be able to
conduct economical opera Lions in Lhis
area for many years to come. These
people urge that mankind has a far
greater interest at this time in a unified
effort to explore the ocean floor than in
becoming embroiled in premature legal
and poliLical disputes.
The problems involved in regulaLion
of a largely unknown environment have
been involved in recent seabed disarmament discussions. The United
States has constantly advocated steps to
avoid the seabeds becoming an arena for
another round of the arms race and has
now agreed with the Soviet Union on a
drafL treaty which was presented to the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CeO) in Geneva recently.
The joint draft treaty would prohibit
emplanting or emplacing any objects
with nuclear weapons or any other
types of weapons of mass destruction as
well as sLructures, launching installations, or other facilities specifically designed for sLoring, Lesting, or using such
weapons on the seabed and ocean floor
or the subsoil thereof. The treaty prohibitions would apply beyond the maximum contiguous zone provided for in
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
Ct'rtainly agreement on this draft
LreaLy indicates that on important items
of significant interest cooperaLion between the world's two superpowers is
feasible. However, it must also be noted
that whatever the outcome of the seabeds disarmament talks or the ultimate
form of any trl'aLy whieh may emerge,
the many lind diverse views exprcssed in
these negotiations Lhus far clearly point
up the need for further hard knowledge
of the deep ocean floor.
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From the point of view of the Navy,
it may he in our best interest with
respect to thr deep ocean floor to
follow tllOf'e who insist that we apply
the doctrine of freedom of the seas. In
this case thrre would be no distinction
in international law between the legal
status of the high seas and that of the
subjacent seabed beyond the Continental Shclf. Where navigation of submarines is involved, we certainly are interested in free seas. With respect to
deep submersibles that will transit the
bottoms by partial physical contact
with the bottom, we ,are anxious to
preserve free navigation on the ocean
floor. Nevertheless, there will be those
who will advocate the adoption of a
doctrine recognizing the seabeds areas as
being capable of being appropriated by
the first occupier. With the advent of
mining operations on the deep ocean
floor, it is inevitable that there will he
those who will, in the interest of developing the resources of the sea, seek state
protection of areas capable of exploitation. This may lead to claims of outright
sovereignty of the deep ocean floor. If,
ultimately, national control is established to th~ full depth of the oeenn,
effectively 20,000 feet, then there exists
the complex and politically hazardous
international task of dividing a territory
more than three times as large as- that of
the world's landmass.
A reasonahle accommodation of
users in accordance with the doctrine of
freedom of the seas may be the most
promising approach at this stage. Assuming the remote possibility that a
conflict between two exploiters of the
deep ocean floor were to arise in the
immediate future, it is clear that such a
controversy would be governed by internntional law. At the very lI'ast, the
prinriplc of frcrdom of thr scas would
apply. It has 111'1'11 m'crpl,'d hy s,'"f"ring
Ilations for cI'nturirs lhat frerdOIll of
thr high seas shall be eXI!rciscd with a
reasonable regard to the interests of
other states in their exercise of the

freedom of the seas.
Today we face a pl(:thora of fishing
interests and oil interests, as well as
political interests which view the oceans
as an area of experimentation in international organization.
These interests have at their disposal
a large battery of extremely competent
and aggressive legal representatives.
Each group appears to he singlemindedly pursuing its own ends. Certainly, these diverse interests can and
will be accommodated in a friendly
manner. But, the only way in which the
Navy can hope to advance its mission to
safeguard the national security is to
meet these challenges with equal preparation and expertise. Everyone can
come up with a mockup of defense
reasons for supporting any proposal.
The challenge is for the Navy to take
the lead by making fine "on ballanee"
military decisions and advancing them
persuasively and in unison.
The lawyer can do no more than help
his client decide and then do everything
possible to insure that his client succeeds. For this we need penetrating
analysis and deep reflection, with the
sober realization that severe restrictions
on the Navy's right to go where it needs
on and under the seas will hamper its
vital mission and inevitahly affect its
central role in U.S. strategic and tactical
planning.
Man has now stepped on the moon
-which dramatically reminds us that no
area will remain forever inaccessible to
mankind. However, the first footprints
on the lunar surface do not constitute a
superhighway which requires immediate
formulation of an extensive traffic regulation code. Likewise, the first steps of
man into the depths of ocean space do
not signal the need to immediately
"h:lIlcion lhe inll'rnationallaw of lhl' sra
which has rvolved oVI'r hundreds of
years. This body of law cannot and
should not be prematurely replaced
with new legal regimes designed to mect
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new needs and uses which are at best
only partially foreseeable.
Even with regard to the classic use of
the surface of the high seas for navigation, we are faced with immediate and
perplexing international legal problems.
An example of such a problem has
arisen as a result of the rapid Soviet
buildup of naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.
Since the Arah-hraeli war in June
1967, we have been faced wi th this
important naval confrontation in the
Mediterranean. The strategic and political implications of this confrontation
are weighty indeed. However, I would
like to describe briefly the legal context
in which the Soviet Fleet, and in particular its suhmarine fleet, meets the
American Fleet.
There is nothing unique in having
large naval fleets of two potentially
hostile maritime powers deployed on
the high seas in peacetime. Indeed, I can
think of no extended period of time in
modern history when this has not been
the case. It is only natural for these
fleets to seek maximum information
regarding their respective oprrations and
deployments. There is no legal prohibition to observation of naval operations
on the high seas. Such activities are
lawful so long as the observer dOf$ not
unreasonahly interfere with the activities of the observed vessels-and vice
versa. Specifically, when the vessels are
near each other and there may be risk of
collision, they must respect the detailed
"rules of the road" established by the
international regulations for preventing
collisions at sea.
However, from a legal point of view,
vessels engaged in AS\\' operations
present somewhat unique problems.
These problems arise from the fact that
although tlu're are highly d"taill'd navigational mIt'S re:rardin:r surfllee ships
which an' nt'ar t'ach other, this is not
the case with submerged submarines.
The international rules of the road

generally apply only to vessels on the
surface.
This does nol mean there is no law
on the subject, but rather that general
principles of law have not been given
detailed application in an international
treaty. Thus, the problem is that of
applying these general legal principles to
operational facts. From existing principles we can generally conclude that
naval forces in time of peace must
exercise prudent seamanship to avoid
endangering foreign submarines and
must not unreasonably interfere with
their right to navigate or conduct other
lawful activities on or under the high
seas.
However, in the context of maintaining a submarine contact, additional
unique facts are introduced. A specific
example of this problem might be helpful. There is some judicial authority to
the effect that a submarine navigating
suhmcrged has a duty to remain dear of
all surface ships. However, the rationale
of the case was that since the location
of the submarine could not be ascertained by other vessels unless it was on
the surface, the burden of staying clear
necessarily falls upon the suhmarine. It
is then·forc doubtful whether this legal
precedent has any significant value
where the surface ships involved have
substantial capability to detl!ct tlw
presence of the submerged submarine,
and are, in fact, deployed for that
purpose.
The international regulations for preventing collisions at sea were designed
to dl'al with situations arising out of
normal maritime traffic. Although their
legal application is not so limitrd, there
are no specific rules designed to handle
a situation where one vessel actually
desires to remain in close proximity
with foreign vessels over a substantial
pl'riod of time. Thrrrfort', we 31111 other
lar:rt' naval powers m\l:;I, n·eol!nizing Iht'
IU'crssit y 0 f obst'rving foreign naval
operations on the high seas, rely on
general rules requiring prudrnt seaman-
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ship and prohibiting unreasonable interference.
Thl' right of the United States to
conduct naval exercises on the high seas
is proteetl'd under international law
from unrem;onable intl'rferenee. It
would he difficult to aUempt to lay
down hard and fast rulcs of remmnahleness in advance where AS\\' opcrations
an' concernl'd. The reason for this is
rl·lativr.ly simple. Both the United Statcs
and the Soviet lInion have inll~rests on
both sides of the issue. We are each

coneerned with the rights of our submarines as well as our ASW forces. It
would be impractical to lay this question before a large international conference ill order to develop a lawmaking
treaty on the subject.
This is not an ideal situation, but it
ilJlIstnltes that in practice a situation
nol suhject to existing detailed legal
rules can prove generally workable.
Soviet reaction to quite a few contacts
indicates they consider them significant
naval incidents.
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